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I. INTRODUCTION
After the Civil War, Congress enacted a statutory private right of
action to ensure the protection of an individual's federal civil rights."
This right of action, now codified at Title 42, Section 1983 of the
United States Code, creates liability for anyone who, acting under a
state law, program, or policy, infringes on an individual's federal rights.2
1. Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22 sec. 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). That Act was entitled
"An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States and for Other Purposes." Id.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
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Although the authors of Section 1983 intended the statute to serve pri-
marily as a mechanism for the protection of federal constitutional
rights,3 the United States Supreme Court has recognized that Section
1983 is a valid tool for enforcing a wide variety of statutorily created
federal rights as well.4 The Court has developed a three-part test to
determine whether a potential plaintiff may bring a Section 1983 action
under a given statute.5 For a Section 1983 cause of action to lie, a court
must ask: (1) whether the statute in question creates binding obliga-
tions for the state or local government; (2) whether the plaintiff asserts
an interest under the statute that is not too vague and amorphous to
enforce; and (3) whether the statute in question was intended to benefit
the putative plaintiff.
6
Recently, in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association,7 the United
States Supreme Court held that health care providers receiving reim-
bursements under state Medicaid programs may bring suits in federal
court challenging state reimbursement schemes under Section 1983.1
While perhaps unsurprising in light of the Court's decade-long expan-
sion of Section 1983 rights,9 the Wilder decision does not fit neatly into
the Court's prior Section 1983 jurisprudence. 10 Wilder also appears to
ignore federal legislative attempts to allow states a greater degree of
flexibility in developing cost-effective provider reimbursement
programs."
Largely in response to rapidly increasing health care costs and ex-
of the United States. . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
3. Senator Edmunds, Chairman of the Senate committee on the Judiciary in 1871, claimed
that Congress intended the bill merely to protect individuals' constitutional rights against state
infringement. See CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 568 (1871), cited in Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 171 (1960).
4. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1979). In Thiboutot the Court recognized the right
of Social Security recipients to bring a § 1983 action alleging that the state had violated their
federal rights under the Social Security Act. Id. at 4. Similarly, in Wright v. City of Roanoke
Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 419 (1986), the Court allowed tenants in
federal housing to bring a § 1983 cause of action to protect their statutory rights. See also Golden
State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989) (granting both unions and manage-
ment § 1983 rights under the Taft Hartley Act).
5. See Dennis v. Higgins, 111 S. Ct. 865, 871 (1991) (summarizing the Court's three-part
analysis).
6. Id.
7. 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990).
8. Id. at 2525.
9. See infra part III.A.
10. See infra part IV.B.3.
11. See infra part II.B.
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penditures,'2 in 1980 Congress enacted the Boren Amendment' s (the
Amendment) to the Medicaid statute.14 Congress designed the Amend-
ment primarily to give states broad rate-making power and to allow
states to develop reimbursement schemes that would encourage pro-
vider efficiency.' 5 In the years following the adoption of the Amend-
ment, states developed a variety of cost-containment measures in an
attempt to cope with rising health care costs, increasing reimbursement
expenditures, and shrinking federal contributions to state Medicaid
programs.'
6
States, however, were not the only entities to feel squeezed by the
failure of revenues to offset increased costs. Faced with the prospect of
rapidly diminishing profits, health care providers began to challenge
state reimbursement schemes in federal court under Section 1983 and
the Boren Amendment.' 7 Although the lower courts first appeared re-
luctant to extend a Section 1983 right of action to providers, by the
mid-1980s, federal circuit courts had begun to recognize such a right.'8
This line of cases culminated in 1990 with the Supreme Court's decision
in Wilder.
The Wilder decision promises to engender a significant amount of
litigation as states, seeking ways to keep Medicaid expenditures to a
minimum while ensuring that poorer citizens receive adequate health
care, come in conflict with health care providers seeking to maximize
reimbursement rates and maintain profitability. By recognizing the Sec-
tion 1983 provider action, the Wilder Court both ensured a greater de-
gree of federal control over state Medicaid reimbursement schemes and
encouraged providers to seek federal interference in state determina-
tions of how best to allocate cost increases between health care recipi-
ents and providers. Yet, while it is clear that both recipients and
providers have an interest in how these costs are allocated, it is not at
all clear that Congress intended for providers and the federal courts to
play a significant role in the allocation process. To the contrary, the
Boren Amendment, with its emphasis on state control and the provision
12. See infra part II.
13. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 962, 94 Stat. 2599, 2650-51
(1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (1988)). Congress extended the Boren
Amendment in 1981 to cover hospital providers, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2173, 95 Stat. 357, 808-09
(1981), and again in 1987 to cover intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded, Pub. L.
No. 100-203, § 4211(h)(2)(A), 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-205 (1987).
14. The statutory requirements for the Medicaid program can be found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-
1396s (1988).
15. See infra part II.B.
16. See infra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
17. See infra part III.B.
18. See infra notes 162-167 and accompanying text.
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of adequate health services to qualified individuals, indicates that states
and recipients should dominate the allocation process. 19
This Note examines the Supreme Court's decision in Wilder v. Vir-
ginia Hospital Association allowing health care providers to bring sub-
stantive Section 1983 claims for reasonable and adequate
reimbursement under the Medicaid statute. Part II outlines the Medi-
caid reimbursement system and the problems of rapidly rising expendi-
tures and costs currently plaguing the Medicaid program. Part II also
reviews congressional efforts, through the enactment of the Boren
Amendment, to increase state control and flexibility in balancing the
interests of health care recipients and providers. Part III addresses the
expansion of Section 1983 rights during the 1980s and the development
of the Section 1983 provider action in the lower federal courts.
Part IV discusses the Wilder decision and its effect on Section 1983
jurisprudence and the increasingly daunting task of providing adequate
health care for the poor. Part IV suggests that the substantive Section
1983 right for providers is inappropriate under the Boren Amendment,
which delegated all essential Medicaid rate-making power to the states.
Part IV also outlines the possible ramifications of Wilder against the
backdrop of rising medical costs and the continuing pressure on states
to enact cost-containment measures. Part IV argues that federal control
of Medicaid reimbursement, through the creation of a Section 1983
right for providers, may curtail innovative state attempts to control
health care costs. Ironically, failure to control costs may lead to less,
rather than more, health care for Medicaid recipients. Finally, Part V
suggests that states may be able to use the Eleventh Amendment to
limit the impact of Section 1983 provider rights and to limit federal
control over state rate-making schemes. This Note concludes that, al-
though Wilder may engender a significant number of provider suits, in-
novative use of Eleventh Amendment doctrine may allow states to
enact careful but creative cost-containment measures without wasting
time and money in federal court vindicating those programs.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Medicaid and Health Care Costs
The United States instituted the Medicaid program twenty-seven
years ago as an attempt to provide the poor with adequate access to
health care. 0 The roots of the program lie in New Deal notions of an
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13). See generally part II.B, infra, for a more complete discus-
sion of this point.
20. See S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943-
45; see also CANNAS ET AL., AMERICAN HEALTH LAW 168 (1990). Both Medicaid and Medicare basi-
[Vol. 45:487490
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active role for the government in providing fundamental services for
citizens.21 Medicaid originally targeted four groups of individuals: the
elderly, families eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) welfare, the blind, and the disabled." During the 1980s, how-
ever, Congress expanded the categorical eligibility for Medicaid
benefits.23
Today, Medicaid is a joint state and federal program. The federal
government does not require state participation, but states that have
chosen to provide Medicaid coverage to their citizens must meet federal
requirements.24 Individuals who meet federal eligibility requirements
for Medicaid also must satisfy state eligibility requirements to receive
coverage. 5 To qualify, individuals or families generally must fall below
certain minimum income and resource levels set by the states."6 States,
however, may elect to provide Medicaid coverage to individuals who or-
dinarily would not meet eligibility requirements if medical catastrophe
has forced those individuals to exhaust many of their financial
resources.
2 7
Rather than paying eligible persons directly, Medicaid reimburses
health care providers for their treatment of eligible individuals. 28 Like
states, health care providers elect whether to participate in Medicaid.
Participating providers generally must accept Medicaid reimburse-
ments as payment in full for their services.29 For a large number of hos-
pitals and nursing homes across the United States, Medicaid payments
cally provide government-funded health insurance. Nonetheless, they are two different programs.
Although there is some overlap in the coverage of the two programs, Medicare, which is entirely
federally funded, primarily targets the elderly. Medicaid, on the other hand, mainly covers certain
categories of people living in poverty.
21. S. REP. No. 404, supra note 20, at 1943-45; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988). In many states, the elderly and the disabled may receive slightly
higher per capita benefits than single parent families. See Sylvia A. Law, Women, Work, Welfare
and the Preservation of the Patriarchy, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1249 (1983).
23. In 1986 Congress amended the law to require states to provide Medicaid coverage for all
poor children under the age of nineteen, regardless of whether the family qualified for AFDC. Pub
L. No. 99-272, §§ 9505(b)(2), 9510(a), 100 Stat. 82 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(III), 1396d(n)(2) (1988)). In 1988, Congress opened Medicaid eligibility to
two-parent families in which one parent has a work history but currently is unemployed. See Fam-
ily Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 303(a), 102 Stat. 2343, 2385-91 (1988) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-6 (1988)).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1988).
25. Id.; see also Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34 (1981) (outlining the federal regula-
tions for different state approaches to eligibility for categorically needy recipients).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1988); see also 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.600-04 (1991).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10)(c) (1988); see also 42 C.F.R. § 435 (1991).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (1988).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(i) (1988) permits a state to terminate the certification of some health




represent a substantial percentage of annual income and, thus, are cru-
cial to their financial health."
The importance of Medicaid reimbursement to health care provid-
ers can be understood only when viewed against the backdrop of rap-
idly rising health care costs and expenditures. Since 1960, national
health expenditures have grown faster than the gross national product
(GNP),"' and, by the late 1980s, health care costs were rising faster
than the rate of inflation. 2 Between 1988 and 1989, for example, health
care expenditures increased eleven percent,3 and in 1989 national
health expenditures totaled 604.1 billion dollars, more than eleven per-
cent of the GNP. 4
Government expenditures on health care have risen correspond-
ingly. Medicaid and Medicare combined now represent approximately
fourteen percent of the federal budget,35 and during the 1980s the
states, on average, allocated almost eleven percent of their annual budg-
ets to health care expenditures. 6 In 1988, Medicaid alone financed al-
most ten percent of all hospital care and approximately forty-four
percent of all nursing home care in the United States.37
Economists have identified several causes underlying the rapid in-
crease in health care costs. Contributing factors include general infla-
tion in the economy, industry-specific inflation, technological
innovations in medicine that continue to drive up the cost of health
care, and the aging of America, which has increased the demand for
health care.3 s Due to all these factors, health care expenditures in the
1980s represented an increasingly significant portion of both govern-
ment and individual spending.
3 9
Despite this substantial increase in the nation's health care ex-
penditures, many hospitals are struggling to meet the costs of providing
that care.40 Changing demand patterns, brought about in part by the
growing percentage of elderly Americans in the population, have led to
30. See Kenneth R. Wing, American Health Policy in the 1980's, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
608, 641 (1985-86).
31. Office of National Cost Estimates, National Health Expenditures, 1988, HEALTH CARE
FINANCING REV., Summer 1990, at 1, 2 [hereinafter National Health Expenditures, 1988].
32. Helen C. Lazenby & Suzanne W. Letsch, National Health Expenditures, 1989, HEALTH
CARE FINANCING REV., Winter 1990, at 1 [hereinafter National Health Expenditures, 1989].
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 9.
36. National Health Care Expenditures, 1988, supra note 31, at 1.
37. Id. at 5, 22.
38. Id. at 643-47; see also, National Health Expenditures, 1989, supra note 32, at 4 fig. 2.
39. See, e.g., Wing supra note 30, at 650, 657. Wing predicted that Medicaid will continue to
outgrow state revenue and other expenditures.
40. See infra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
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an increasing demand for health care services41 and a concomitant in-
crease in hospital costs.,2 The elderly use both a greater quantity of
medical care and a higher degree of sophisticated and expensive medi-
cal care than their younger counterparts. 4 Technological innovations
continue to change the face of health care.44 Procedures such as organ
transplants, genetic testing, and certain types of cancer treatment are
much more accessible to the public today than they were in the 1970s. 45
Yet these innovations also have driven up the operating costs of
hospitals.46
In response to these rising costs, both private insurance companies
and government reimbursement programs such as Medicare imple-
mented cost-control measures in the 1980s. Health Maintenance Orga-
nizations (HMOs), for example, attempted to control costs by
prepaying providers a lump sum for the treatment of all HMO members
in an upcoming year.47 Medicare also adopted a prepayment scheme
creating diagnostically related groups.48 Under that scheme providers
receive set payments based on the illness of each patient regardless of
the length of the patient's stay in the hospital.49
After Congress modified Medicaid reimbursement standards in
1980,5o states adopted various cost-containment measures for Medicaid
41. See Maxwell J. Mehiman, Age-Based Rationing and Technological Development, 33 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 671 (1989) (reacting critically to a proposal to ration life-extending health care for
the elderly and to limit the development of new life-extending technologies). The basis of the
proposed rationing is the utilitarian view that increasing technological innovation designed to ex-
tend the lives of the elderly represents a significant drain on societal resources. Id. at 673-74 &
n.17.
42. See Wing, supra note 30, at 643-46.
43. National Health Expenditures, 1989, supra note 32, at 8 & table. 3.
44. See William B. Schwartz, The Inevitable Failure of Current Cost-Containment Strate-
gies, 257 J.A.M.A. 220, 221 (1987) (suggesting that a significant portion of hospital cost increases
are the result of technological change). Examples of technological changes over the past two de-
cades include the introduction of the CAT scan, artificial hearts, organ transplants, and a large
number of new genetic screening and testing procedures. Id. at 222-23.
45. Id. at 220-21.
46. See Maxwell J. Mehhman, Health Care Cost Containment and Medical Technology: A
Critique of Waste Theory, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 778 (1985-86); see also Joint Appendix at 49
(affidavit of Joseph Brecht), Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990) (No. 88-2043).
47. See Jon Gabel et al., The Changing World of Group Health Insurance, HEALTH AFFAIRS,
Summer 1988, at 48, 52-54.
48. Under the Medicare reimbursement scheme, illnesses are classified in diagnostically re-
lated groups, usually by severity or type. Medicare then limits the costs per day and the number of
days of care for which it will reimburse a hospital according to the diagnostically related group into
which the patient's illness falls. See infra note 308 and accompanying text.
49. 42 C.F.R. § 412 (1991); see also Bruce C. Vladeck, Medicare Hospital Payment by Diag-
nosis-Related Groups, 100 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 576 (1984).
50. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub L. No. 96-499, § 962, 94 Stat. 2599, 2650-51
(1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1988)). For a discussion of the subse-
quent extensions of the Boren Amendment, see supra note 13.
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as well. 51 Some states established provider cost levels that they consid-
ered reasonable and adequate for reimbursement. Nebraska, for exam-
ple, set Medicaid payment levels so that the least expensive sixty-five
percent of all Nebraska hospitals received complete reimbursement for
their services.52 Illinois established a program that tried to control costs
by shifting Medicaid patients to less expensive hospitals. 3 Other states
adopted a variety of cost-control measures including flat rates of reim-
bursement or rate caps 54 and rate freezes 55 in the quest to control Medi-
caid expenditures."
Thus, both private and public health care programs often reim-
burse providers for less than the full cost of treating a patient. The
Office of National Cost Estimates reported that, in 1987, private hospi-
tals charged patients 204.7 billion dollars but only received 152.6 billion
dollars in net revenues. 5 7 Similar discrepancies between the Medicaid
costs that hospitals incurred and the Medicaid reimbursements they re-
ceived existed in many states.5 ' In Virginia, for example, the state's at-
tempts to contain health care costs led to the undercompensation of all
hospitals by almost thirty million dollars of approved Medicaid costs in
1986.51 Although many of these hospitals made up for the discrepancy
51. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Connecticut et al., Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct.
2510 (1990) (No. 88-2043).
52. See Nebraska Health Care Ass'n v. Dunning, 778 F.2d 1291, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1063 (1987). The remaining 35% of Nebraska hospitals no longer received full
reimbursement under Medicaid for their services. Id.
53. See J. Warren Salmon et al., Reducing Inpatient Hospital Costs: An Attempt at Medi-
caid Reform in Illinois, 13 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 103 (1988). The Illinois program reimburses
hospitals for the number of patient-days of care they provide for Medicaid patients. More expen-
sive hospitals receive payment for fewer patient-days than do less expensive hospitals. Once a
hospital uses up its allotted patient days, Medicaid reimburses the hospital only for emergency
treatment. The hospital is expected to transfer all other Medicaid patients to different hospitals.
Id. at 110.
54. See, e.g., Dunning, 778 F.2d at 1292-93 (challenging Nebraska's reimbursement policy in
which the state fully reimbursed only the 65% of nursing homes with the lowest costs and partially
reimbursed all other nursing homes at the 65th percentile level); see also Colorado Health Care v.
Colorado Dep't of Social Servs., 842 F.2d 1158, 1161 (10th Cir. 1988) (noting that Colorado estab-
lished a 90th percentile rate cap).
55. See, e.g., Wisconsin Hosp. Ass'n v. Reivitz, 733 F.2d 1226, 1228 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting
that Wisconsin froze reimbursement rates in 1982 and 1983).56. See, e.g., Weber Memorial Care Center v. Department of Health, 751 P.2d 831 (Utah
App. 1988); Golden Five Inc. v. Department of Social Serv., 425 N.W.2d 865 (Neb. 1988).
57. National Health Expenditures, 1988, supra note 31, at 2.
58. For discussions of various state reimbursement schemes that do not completely reim-
burse providers, see Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510, 2514 n.3 (1990); Colorado
Health Care Ass'n, 842 F.2d at 1161-64 & n.2; Wilmac Corp. v. Heckler, 633 F. Supp. 1000, 1004
(E.D. Pa. 1986); Quincy City Hosp. v. Rate Setting Comm'n, 548 N.E.2d 869, 870-71 (Mass. 1990).
59. Joint Appendix at 47 (affidavit of J. John McMahon), Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n,
110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990) (No. 88-2043). Mr. McMahon claimed that cost-containment programs hurt
some Virginia hospitals to such an extent that they elected not to pay hospital association dues
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in patient revenues by increasing income from philanthropy, parking,
gift shops, and state subsidies, some still felt squeezed between rising
costs and cost-control measures.60
State and local public hospitals often fared worse than private hos-
pitals. Because public hospitals frequently treat a disproportionate
number of low-income patients, these providers usually are less able to
compensate for government cost-cutting measures by shifting costs to
private patients. 1 In 1987, state and local providers absorbed over
thirty percent of all the bad debt in the health care industry.6 2 Al-
though complete figures are not yet available for subsequent years, the
frequency with which providers have challenged both Medicaid and
Medicare reimbursement rates indicates that providers continue to feel
squeezed by these cost-containment measures.6 3
Moreover, both the federal and state governments feel increasing
budgetary pressure to control health expenditures. The federal govern-
ment has struggled during the 1980s under Gramm-Rudman budget re-
quirements,6 and even states that occasionally ran budget surpluses in
the late 1980s face a much more ominous task of balancing their budg-
ets in the 1990s.6 5 During the economic recession of 1990 and 1991,
many states faced the reality of lower tax revenues, making the job of
balancing state budgets even more difficult.6
because of financial hardship. Id.
60. National Health Expenditures, 1988, supra note 31, at 6; see also West Virginia Univ.
Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 14 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting that "[t]his interesting and complex
appeal arises from the cross-fire currently trapping many hospitals across our nation between ris-
ing operating costs, on the one hand, and federal legislation aimed at the sharp containment of
health delivery costs, on the other"); Johnt Appendix at 46-47 (affidavit of J. John McMahon),
Wilder (No. 88-2043).
61. See Kenneth E. Thorpe & Charles Brecher, Improved Access to Care for the Uninsured
Poor in Large Cities: Do Public Hospitals Make a Difference?, 12 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 313
(1987) (finding that the uninsured poor are more likely to receive hospital care if they live in a city
with a public hospital); see also Judith Feder et al., Poor People and Poor Hospitals: Implications
for Public Policy, 9 J. HEALTH POL, POL'Y & L. 237 (1984) (suggesting that Medicaid and Medicare
cuts significantly hurt the financial well-being of public hospitals).
62. National Health Expenditures, 1988, supra note 31, at 8 table 2.
63. See, e.g., Wilmac Corp. v. Bowen, 811 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1987); Nebraska Health Care
Ass'n v. Dunning, 778 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1063 (1987); Pinnacle Nurs-
ing Home v. Axelrod, 719 F. Supp. 1173 (W.D.N.Y. 1989), vacated in part, 928 F.2d 1306 (2d Cir.
1991); AGI-Bluff Manor, Inc. v. Reagen, 713 F. Supp. 1535 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
64. For a discussion of the effect of budgetary pressures on the federal funding of health
care, see Andreas G. Schneider, Commentary: Legal and Political Pressures on Health Care Cost
Containment, 36 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 693, 699-704 (1985-86).
65. See Troubles Close to Home, TIME, July 15, 1991, at 22; Wilson Tries to Do it Right,
TIME, July 15, 1991, at 23; Weicker Goes His Own Way, TIME, July 15, 1991, at 24. All of these
articles examine the difficulties states have encountered balancing their budgets and note that part
of the problem stems from reduced federal funding.
66. See supra note 36 and accompanying text; see also Robert J. Samuelson, Debt, NEWS-
WEEK, Dec. 31, 1990, at 22.
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In summary, although Americans seem willing to allocate increas-
ing amounts of financial resources to health care, rising costs in the
health care industry may restrict access for many who can no longer
afford complete insurance. For states facing funding limitations, the ris-
ing costs of public insurance programs such as Medicaid create a ten-
sion between the societal need to assure adequate medical care for the
poor and the limited state resources available to fill that need. 7 It is in
this context that both Congress, through the Boren Amendment, and
the states, on their own initiative, have recognized an increasing need
for flexibility in reimbursement schemes to maintain the vitality of the
Medicaid program.
B. The Boren Amendment
Before 1980, the federal government mandated that states partici-
pating in the Medicaid program reimburse providers for the reasonable
cost of services actually provided to Medicaid patients. 8 The Secretary
of Health and Human Services (HHS), rather than the states, set the
reasonable cost standard at levels that usually paralleled Medicare re-
imbursement."' In 1980, however, Congress amended the Medicaid stat-
ute to allow states more flexibility in developing reimbursement
schemes for nursing homes. 70 This legislation is known as the Boren
Amendment. In 1981, Congress extended the Boren Amendment to
cover hospitals.71
The language of the Amendment clearly indicates that Congress in-
tended to delegate primary rate-making authority to the states.72 The
Amendment mandates that states develop the methods and standards
by which they calculate reimbursement rates and makes states respon-
sible for conducting studies that produce "findings that such rates are
67. As one commentator has observed, "[tihe delivery of health care is, after all, one activity
that can be simultaneously described as a system on the brink of crisis and as a strong and growing
industry with equal accuracy." See Wing, supra note 30, at 612.
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (1979); see also H.R. REP. No. 158, Vol. 2, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 279 (1981).
69. See supra note 68.
70. Pub. L. No. 96-499 § 962(a), 94 Stat. 2650 (1980).
71. Pub. L. No. 97-35 § 2173, 95 Stat. 808 (1981). The Boren Amendment provides in part:
[A] State plan for medical assistance must. . . provide. . . for payment ... of the hospital
services, nursing facility services, and services in an intermediate care facility for the mentally
retarded. . . through the use of rates (determined in accordance with the methods and stan-
dards developed by the State. . .) which the State finds, and makes assurances satisfactory
to the Secretary, are reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by
efficiently and economically operated facilities. .
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1988).
72. The Amendment mandates that reimbursement rates are to be "determined in accor-
dance with the methods and standards developed by the states." Id.
[Vol. 45:487496
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reasonable. '7 - Moreover, the Secretary of HHS retains only minimal
oversight authority under the Amendment. The Secretary reviews only
state assurances of reasonableness, not the reasonableness of rates
themselves.74 If the Secretary fails to act within ninety days, the state
assurances are deemed adequate.7 5 Another factor limiting federal over-
sight is the lack of any substantive language in the Amendment that
would provide criteria for determining which rates are reasonable and
adequate for economically and efficiently operated providers.7 6 Thus, al-
though the Amendment binds states to act within certain procedural
guidelines and allows the Secretary to reject state assurances on a case-
by-case basis, it creates no clear guidelines for what is or is not a legiti-
mate rate.
The legislative history of the Amendment also indicates that Con-
gress intended to give states broad rate-making power. Both the House
and the Senate reports on the Amendment clearly demonstrate that
Congress recognized the budgetary pressures on the states to enact
greater cost-control measures. 77 The Boren Amendment was part of a
package of Medicaid changes that included a potentially significant cut
in federal contributions to state Medicaid programs. Congress expected
to cut federal outlays for Medicaid by more than 900 million dollars in
fiscal year 1982.78 The new law also provided for a scaled reduction of
federal payments to states in later years.79 Congress intended to cut
Medicaid payments an additional two percent in 1983 and one percent
in 1984.80 Because federal money constituted between fifty and eighty-
three percent of the Medicaid funding for any state, Congress knew the
planned cuts would have a significant impact."' In rejecting the reason-
able-cost reimbursement standard, the Senate Committee on Finance
noted that the standard had been based on principles that were "inher-
ently inflationary." 82 Congress anticipated that, under the new legisla-
tion, states would adopt cost-containment measures similar to the
prospective payment schemes based on diagnostically related groups
that Congress was considering for the Medicare program. 3
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.; see also 42 C.F.R. § 447.253 (1989).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d (1988). Although this section defines various terms in the Act, the
statute does not define the terms reasonable, adequate, economically, or efficiently.
77. See H.R. REP. No. 158, supra note 68, at 292; S. Rep. No. 139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 477
(1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 744.
78. H.R. REP. No. 158, supra note 68, at 279, 281-82.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 281-82.
81. Id. at 283.
82. Id. at 293.
83. Id. at 292-95.
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Faced with federal cutbacks, states were left with three options for
reforming their Medicaid programs. First, states could choose to offset
federal cutbacks by increasing revenue locally. This option, however,
lost its appeal in the late 1980s as state governments, already
overburdened by the Reagan abdication of federal responsibility for do-
mestic needs, faced additional hardships due to a recession and local
opposition to increased taxes.84 Second, states could respond to federal
cutbacks by reducing the scope or duration of certain covered services
under Medicaid. This option, however, would reduce access to health
care for poorer citizens. Although the Medicaid Act requires states to
fund certain care services, other services like dental care, optical care,
and prescription drugs are optional."' States that cover these services
easily could cut them in light of reduced funding.8 Third, states could
reduce reimbursement to providers in an attempt to force providers to
control the costs of medical care. By reducing reimbursement rates,
states would provide hospitals with an incentive to reduce inefficiencies
in care. Theoretically, hospitals could eliminate unnecessary medical
tests, reduce the length of patient stays, be more selective in their
choice of new technologies, and eliminate administrative inefficiency to
cut costs.
8 7
The Boren Amendment was designed to facilitate this third option.
Under the reasonable care standard used before 1980, states set Medi-
caid reimbursement rates that paralleled Medicare's reasonable cost
rates, which were fixed by the Secretary of HHS.8 Thus,. prior to the
enactment of the Boren Amendment, the federal government, not the
states, actually controlled reimbursement rates. When federal cutbacks
became a reality in the early 1980s, Congress enacted the Boren
Amendment to give states some flexibility in developing cost-contain-
ment measures. The Amendment allowed states to set Medicaid reim-
bursement rates. By so doing, Congress recognized that federal control
of the rate-setting process, which failed to take adequate account of
variations in local economies, was "inherently inflationary."89
84. See supra npte 51.
85. 42 C.F.R. §§ 440.210, 440.220, 440.1-440.180 (1991). Sections 440.1-440.180 define the
medical services discussed under the Medicaid regulations. Sections 440.210 and 440.220 indicate
which of those services states must provide as minimum Medicaid coverage.
86. See, e.g., White v. Beal, 555 F.2d. 1146 (3d Cir. 1977) (recognizing that state coverage of
optical services must be rationally related to medical need, but that the state can forego coverage
of such service altogether).
87. See, e.g., Wing, supra note 30; Sloan, Rate Regulation as a Strategy for Hospital Cost
Control: Evidence from the Last Decade, 61 MILBANK MEM. FUND Q. 195 (1983).
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (providing the reimbursement stan-
dard as it read before the Boren Amendment); H.R. REP. No. 158, supra note 68, at 280.
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (1988); S. REP. No. 139, supra note 77, at 478.
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Social choice theory also sheds some light on congressional motiva-
tions behind the Boren Amendment.90 With the Medicaid legislation of
1981, Congress, in part, may have bowed to intense executive pressure
to cut spending on domestic programs. Two groups clearly bore the
brunt of such cuts: providers and patients. Because both Medicaid re-
cipients and health care providers have well-organized, powerful lobby-
ing groups,91 placing these costs exclusively on either group might have
aroused significant interest group opposition. The Boren Amendment
allowed Congress to avoid any such discreet allocation of these concen-
trated social costs. Instead, Congress gave states the responsibility of
distributing these costs between the providers and patients as the states
saw fit.92 Ultimately, then, the states took political responsibility for
distributing the burdens of the cutback because the federal government
wanted to wash its hands of this allocation.
Surrounding sections of the Boren Amendment bear out this inter-
pretation of the reimbursement provisions. In the section directly pre-
ceding the reimbursement provisions, Congress explicitly allowed states
to place limits on Medicaid recipients' choices of medical treatments as
long as those limits were related to cost effectiveness and the recipients
still had reasonable access to health care.9 s The Boren Amendment sim-
ply granted states the same authority to establish reimbursement
schemes for providers.
Despite its abdication of control over the rate-setting process, Con-
gress did indicate a preference that state reimbursement schemes work
to increase provider efficiency rather than to funnel the cost of reim-
bursement deficiencies on to consumers or Medicaid patients.94 Al-
lowing the latter would destroy any distribution of the burdens of
cutbacks between patients and providers, leaving patients to bear the
90. See MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS
(1981). Social choice theory analyzes the legislature through a market approach. It views statutes
as deals between interest groups and legislators who ."sell" statutes to get reelected. Statutes gen-
erally are divided into four categories depending on their effects. If a statute will burden small,
cohesive groups in society, it has concentrated costs. If a statute burdens most of society, its costs
are distributed. Likewise, a statute that benefits small, cohesive groups has concentrated benefits.
If a statute benefits all of society, it has distributed benefits. Any statute may combine any of
these effects. Because small, cohesive interest groups tend to be better organized and, thus, more
politically effective, Congress is least likely to pass statutes with clear concentrated costs. Instead,
it may attempt to avoid such a situation by delegation of the problem to some other governmental
body.
91. Several of these lobbying groups are well known, including the Gray Panthers, the Ameri-
can Association of Retired People (AARP), the American Medical Association (AMA), and the
American Hospital Association (AHA).
92. S. REP. No. 139, supra note 77, at 472-74.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (1988); see also S. REP. No., 139, supra note 77, at 476-77.
94. H.R. REP No. 158, supra note 68, at 280, 293; S. REP. No. 139, supra note 77, at 478.
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entire burden of federal cutbacks."5 Nonetheless, the Boren Amend-
ment requires that reimbursement rates enable hospitals to provide ad-
equate and effective care for Medicaid recipients.9 6 This mandate has
been implemented by federal regulations that require states to provide
reimbursement to providers in an amount which ensures that crucial
health care services remain available to Medicaid recipients . 7
Thus, the only limit on state discretion that emerges from the stat-
ute and its legislative history is a concern for continued patient access
to quality health care. If the language of the Amendment creates any
federal rights, then it appears to confer those rights on Medicaid pa-
tients, not providers - patients must receive adequate care. Beyond
this constraint, the Boren Amendment leaves reimbursement to the
states. In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association," however, the Su-
preme Court reached the opposite conclusion, finding that the Boren
Amendment creates substantive Section 1983 rights for health care
providers.9 " Yet, provider notions of how health resources should be al-
located may be very different from those of the patients or of society as
a whole.
III. SECTION 1983 AND THE BOREN AMENDMENT
A. The Expansion of Section 1983 Jurisprudence in the 1980s
When Section 1983 became law during the Reconstruction, the
statute served largely as a tool for vindicating civil rights injuries and
other constitutional claims.100 During the 1980s, however, the Supreme
Court significantly expanded the use of Section 1983. In Maine v.
Thiboutot,101 the Court held that the plain language of Section 1983
95. The Senate report on the bill indicates that it was "not intended to encourage arbitrary
reductions in payment that would adversely affect the quality of care." S. REP. No. 139, supra note
77, at 478.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1989). The Amendment states that hospitals must be able
"to provide care and services in conformity with applicable State and Federal laws, regulations,
and quality and safety standards and to assure that individuals eligible for medical assistance have
reasonable access . . . to inpatient hospital services of adequate quality. . . ." Id.
97. 42 C.F.R. § 447.204 (1990).
98. 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990).
99. Id. at 2525.
100. See CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess., app. 60, 80, 83-85, cited in Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 171 (1960). Section 1983 was originally part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871,
17 Stat. 13 (1871). That Act was entitled "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and for other Purposes." Senator Edmunds,
Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary that considered the original bill, noted that
the bill "merely carr[ied] out the principles of the civil rights bill, which has since become a part of
the Constitution, [i.e. the Fourteenth Amendment]." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at 568,
quoted in Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171.
101. 448 U.S. 1 (1979).
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makes it applicable to all statutorily created federal rights as well as
those created by the Constitution.102 Building on an earlier decision
that applied Section 1983 to state officers who had violated a plaintiff's
rights, 03 Thiboutot suggested a broad application of Section 1983 to all
forms of official violation of federally protected rights'0 4 and prefaced a
decade-long expansion of Section 1983 rights. The road to the expan-
sion of these rights, however, occasionally twisted back on itself as the
Court groped for a workable test that would help it determine the ap-
propriate use of Section 1983.
In Pennhurst v. Halderman,0 5 for example, the Supreme Court
considered whether the Patient's Bill of Rights in the Developmentally
Disabled Act (DDA) 06 could support an implied private cause of action
on behalf of patients. Although the Patient's Bill of Rights stated that
patients should receive the least restrictive treatment possible in order
to "maximize their development potential,' ' 0 7 the Court refused to find
an implied private cause of action for patients of mental institutions. 08
Several factors suggested that the patient-plaintiffs in Pennhurst
had a valid claim. First, the DDA created a joint federal-state program
and required states to make assurances to the federal government that
the provisions of the Act had been met.109 Second, Congress gave no
indication that it intended administrative remedial schemes to be the
exclusive remedy in the Act. 10 Third, the patients claimed their rights
under statutory language stating that "[p]ersons with developmental
102. Id. at 4.
103. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700-01 (1978) (stating
that "there can be no doubt that [§ 1983] was intended to provide a remedy, to be broadly con-
strued, against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights").
104. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4.
105. 451 U.S. 1 (1981). In Pennhurst, residents of a state institution for the profoundly re-
tarded brought suit against Pennsylvania under the DDA, claiming that the state program failed to
live up to the Patients' Bill of Rights in the DDA. Id. at 5-6. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that
conditions at Pennhurst were "unsanitary,* inhumane, and dangerous." Id. They sought both in-
junctive and monetary relief and demanded that Pennhurst be closed. Id.
The Pennhurst decision does not explicitly indicate that the Court was considering a § 1983
claim. Nonetheless, Pennhurst's analysis has been incorporated into subsequent § 1983 cases.
Thus, Pennhurst clearly merits discussion here.
106. Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-103, § 201,
89 Stat. 486, 502 (1975) (current version codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6009 (1988)).
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The Patient's Bill of Rights reads, in
pertinent part:
The treatment, services, and habilitation for a person with developmental disabilities should
be designed to maximize the developmental potential of the person and should be provided in
the setting that is least restrictive of the person's personal liberty.
Id. § 6010(2).
108. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 31-32.
109. Id. at 14-15.
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 6005-09, 6061-63 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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disabilities have a right to appropriate treatment, services, and habilita-
tion for such disabilities."" Thus, the DDA arguably frames the states'
obligation to fulfill those rights.112
The Court, however, rejected the plaintiffs' claim.1 Because the
statute contained mere findings without enforceable mandatory stan-
dards," 4 it provided insufficient support for the rights and duties the
plaintiffs claimed the statute conferred and mandated." 5 More signifi-
cantly, the Court noted, the limited federal funding available under the
Act would not defray the costs of implementing the Bill of Rights.""
Thus, the Court concluded that Congress did not intend the statute to
create substantive rights."
7
Six years after the Pennhurst decision, the Court refined the test
for determining the existence of a Section 1983 statutory action. In
Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority"
8
the Court held that a Section 1983 cause of action would lie unless Con-
gress specifically foreclosed such action in the statute or the statute did
not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities. 19 A carefully
tailored administrative scheme in the statute could provide evidence
that a Section 1983 action was foreclosed under the first prong; horta-
tory rather than mandatory statutory language would indicate the ab-
sence of statutory rights under the second prong.2 0
In Wright low income tenants alleged that the City of Roanoke had
overbilled them for utilities and violated rent ceilings imposed by the
Brooke Amendment to the Housing Act of 1937.121 Like the patients in
111. Id. § 6010(1); see also Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 20 (stating that the Patient's Bill of
Rights was only intended to encourage, not mandate, provision of these services for the disabled).
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 6010(3) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
113. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 31-32.
114. The preamble to the Patient's Bill of Rights notes that "Congress makes the following
findings respecting the rights of persons with developmental disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979). The implication from this language is that the rights underlying the finding still
would exist even if Congress had made no findings. This analysis is inconsistent with Pennhurst's
conclusion that patients had no rights.
115. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 19 (noting that the language in the Patient's Bill of Rights pro-
vided "too thin a reed to support the rights and obligations read into it").
116. Id. at 24. Because enforcing the plaintiffs' claims would have required that states spend
significantly more money than they received under the federal program, the Court concluded that
Congress could not have intended to give patients enforceable rights. The Court thought no state
would be willing to spend millions of dollars to receive only thousands in federal aid. Thus, enforc-
ing patients' rights would drive states out of the DDA program. Id.
117. Id.
118. 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
119. Id. at 423-25.
120! Id.
121. Id. at 419. The Brooke Amendment, Pub. L. No. 91-152, § 213, 83 Stat. 379, 389 (1969)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437a (1988)), set rent ceilings for families living in public
housing on the basis of income.
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Pennhurst, the tenants in Wright clearly were the intended benefi-
ciaries of the statute,122 and some of the statute's legislative history in-
dicated that Congress anticipated private actions in the courts.12 In
addition, the Brooke Amendment and subsequent federal regulations
created clear, easily definable standards. The Amendment required that
tenants pay thirty percent of their monthly adjusted family income as
rent.124 Accompanying HUD regulations indicated that these rent pay-
ments included a "reasonable amount for utilities" 1 25 and also set spe-
cific guidelines that public housing authorities were to follow in
establishing utility allowances.' 2 6 Thus, the Court found that the
Brooke Amendment's requirement that tenants pay only a reasonable
amount for utilities was specific enough to create enforceable federal
rights because both the statute and ensuing federal regulations estab-
lished specific criteria by which courts could judge the reasonableness
of utility allowances.' 27 The Court also concluded that Congress clearly
intended to make tenants the beneficiaries of the Brooke
Amendment.
128
In 1989 the Court continued its trend of recognizing enforceable
federal rights under statutes as long as those rights were not too vague
or amorphous. In Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles 29
the Court built on its Pennhurst and Wright decisions to create a two-
step process for determining whether Section 1983 rights existed.130
First, the Court indicated that a right must exist under the particular
statute.'3 ' It then reaffirmed the Wright and Pennhurst analysis for de-
termining the existence of that right."12 Second, the Court indicated
that the plaintiffs must demonstrate that Congress did not expressly
122. Wright, 479 U.S. at 424-25.
123. Id. at 425 & n.7 (citing Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1981:
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development of the House Com-
mittee on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 654 (1981). In these
hearings a HUD officer testified that the narrow statutory limits on judicial review were "not in-
tended ... to eliminate any tenant rights." Id.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
125. 24 C.F.R. § 860.403 (1982).
126. 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.50-.59 (1986).
127. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 431-32.
128. Id. at 430. The Court relied on language in the Amendment which set tenants' rents at
"no more and no less than 30 percent of their income." Id. at 430. It stated that "the intent to
benefit tenants is undeniable." Id.
129. 493 U.S. 103 (1989).
130. Id. at 108-09. In that case, a taxicab franchise sued Los Angeles because the city refused
to renew the plaintiff's franchise license until the plaintiff settled a labor dispute. Id at 103-05.
The taxicab franchise, in a § 1983 claim, asserted that the city violated its right to be free from
state interference under the National Labor Relations Act. Id.
131. Id. at 105.
132. Id. at 106-07.
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foreclose a Section 1983 suit.133
Applying this analysis in Golden State, the Court concluded that
the National Labor Relations Act created enforceable rights for both
management and employees and that these rights included an enforcea-
ble right to be free from state interference in collective bargaining.134 In
support of its conclusion, the Court ited language in the Act that con-
ferred rights on employers and employees.135 It also relied on the long
history of prior case law that suggested that a state had no role to play
in labor-management negotiations. 36
Recently, in Dennis v. Higgins,57 the Court summarized the test
for statutory rights that has emerged from this line of cases. 138 Plain-
tiffs have rights enforceable under Section 1983 if they can satisfy three
basic criteria. First, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the statute on.
which they rely creates binding obligations on the states or on local gov-
ernments.3 9 Second, the interest the plaintiffs assert must not be overly
vague or amorphous. 40 Third, Congress must have intended the statute
in question to benefit the plaintiffs.14' The Court's decision to confer
reimbursement rights on providers under the Boren Amendment, how-
ever, does not appear to meet this emerging standard.
B. The Development of Section 1983 Provider Actions Under the
Boren Amendment
Although most states developed comprehensive administrative pro-
cedures for setting and reviewing provider reimbursement rates, during
the 1980s a significant number of providers challenged these rates in
federal court. 4 2 These challenges, however, created confusion in the
lower courts over the nature of the providers' cause of action. 43 As a
133. Id.
134. Id. at 109.
135. Id. at 109 n.6. The Court looked to language of the Act that stated: "It is the purpose
and policy of this chapter. . . to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers
in their relations affecting commerce . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1988).
136. Golden State Transit Corp., 493 U.S. at 109-11.
137. 111 S. Ct. 865 (1991).




142. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Connecticut et al., Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n, 110 S.
Ct. 2510 (1990) (No. 88-2043) (discussing the comprehensive review procedures of states); see also
Wisconsin Hosp. Ass'n v. Reivitz, 733 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1984); Wilmac Corp. v. Heckler, 633 F.
Supp. 1000 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Colorado Health Care Ass'n v. Colorado Dep't of Social Servs., 598 F.
Supp. 1400 (D. Colo. 1984).
143. See, e.g., Colorado Health Care Ass'n v. Colorado Dep't of Social Servs., 842 F.2d 1158,
1163-64 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding that providers could assert the rights of Medicaid recipients); St.
Michael Hosp. v. Thompson, 725 F. Supp. 1038, 1043-44 (W.D. Wis. 1989) (finding a private right
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result, courts hesitated to take aggressive action in these cases. 144
In several early cases, courts avoided the question of whether prov-
iders had enforceable rights under the Boren Amendment by finding
that providers and recipients of Medicaid had parallel interests under
the Medicaid statute.145 Because reductions in reimbursement rates
might have affected the quality and quantity of care that Medicaid re-
cipients were likely to receive, such reductions potentially infringed on
the rights of Medicaid recipients. Some courts concluded, therefore,
that providers could bring a Section 1983 suit under the Boren Amend-
ment in order to protect the rights of Medicaid recipients. 4 6
Other courts, however, simply ignored the question of whether the
Boren Amendment gave rise to a Section 1983 cause of action for prov-
iders. In Nebraska Health Care Ass'n v. Dunning,147 for example, the
plaintiffs, operators of medical facilities, challenged Nebraska's Medi-
caid rates on behalf of both health care providers and recipients.' 48 The
district court considered the merits of the case without attempting to
distinguish between the rights of providers and recipients under the
Medicaid statute.'
49
Several other courts also expressly rejected the contention that the
Boren Amendment itself gave rise to an implied right of action for
providers. 150 In rejecting claims of an implied right of action, these
of action under the Boren Amendment but refusing to decide the merits of the case because the
Burford abstention doctrine applied); AGI-Bluff Manor, Inc. v. Reagen, 713 F. Supp. 1535, 1542
(W.D. Mo. 1989) (finding no § 1983 right of action under the Boren Amendment); Coalition of
Michigan Nursing Homes, Inc. v. Dempsey, 537 F. Supp. 451, 452 (1982) (asserting an implied
right of action under the Boren Amendment rather than a § 1983 claim).
144. See, e.g., Folden v. Washington State DSHS, 744 F. Supp. 1507, 1525 (W.D. Wash.
1990) (dismissing the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims, but finding a cause of action directly under the
Boren Amendment and reviewing that claim under an arbitrary and capricious standard); Fried-
man v. Perales, 668 F. Supp. 216, 211, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (refusing to "rethink or reweigh the
political and financial considerations" behind rate setting and concluding that the plaintiffs
presented "no triable issue of fact"); cf. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d
11 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding a violation of the Boren Amendment in a § 1983 claim and, thus, striking
down Pennsylvania's reimbursement scheme), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3213 (1990).
145. See, e.g., Colorado Health Care Ass'n, 842 F.2d at 1164 n.5 (declaring that providers
and patients have a parallel interest in reimbursement); Wilmac Corp. v. Bowen, 811 F.2d 809 (3d
Cir. 1987); Nebraska Health Care Ass'n v. Dunning, 575 F. Supp. 176 (D. Neb. 1983).
146. See, e.g., Silver v. Baggiano, 804 F.2d 1211 (11th Cir. 1986) (expressly reserving the
question); Coos Bay Care Center v. State of Oregon, 803 F.2d 1060 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated on
other grounds, 484 U.S. 806 (1987); Nebraska Health Care Ass'n v. Dunning, 778 F.2d 1291 (8th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1063 (1987).
147. 578 F. Supp. 543 (D. Neb. 1983).
148. Id. at 544.
149. Id. at 544-45.
150. See, e.g., Michigan Hosp. Ass'n v. Department of Social Servs., 738 F. Supp. 1080, 1085-
86 (W.D. Mich. 1990); Illinois Health Care Ass'n v. Suter, 719 F. Supp. 1419, 1427 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(holding that no private cause of action to sue the Secretary of Health and Human Services exists
under the Boren Amendment).
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courts relied on a four-step analysis established by the Supreme Court
in Cort v. Ash.151 The Cort analysis first required that the plaintiff be a
member of the class "for whose especial benefit the statute was en-
acted.' 1 52 Second, it demanded evidence of a legislative intent to create
a right. 53 Third, Cort required that the recognition of a federal right of
action be "consistent with the underlying purposes" of the statute in
question. 5 4 Finally, the Court indicated that it would imply the exis-
tence of federal rights only in areas not traditionally relegated to state
law. 55 Subsequent cases suggest that legislative intent is the most im-
portant ingredient of the Cort test.
156
Other courts consistently found no evidence of any legislative in-
tent to create a right of action on behalf of providers under the Boren
Amendment. 57 These courts could not accept the idea that providers
were members of a class for whom Congress designed the law to bene-
fit.' 58 The clearest purpose of the Medicaid program was to provide ac-
cess to medical treatment for the poor, disabled, and elderly, not to
reimburse providers. 159
The reluctance of federal district courts to find an independent
cause of action for health care providers presented a significant hurdle
for those providers seeking federal court review of state rate-setting
procedures. 60 This reluctance also suggested a growing inclination to
151. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Bethlehem Steel published advertisements seeking to mobilize
"truth squads" in an effort to defeat Senator George McGovern's 1972 bid for the Presidency. Id.
at 70. Shareholders brought suit under a federal criminal statute which prohibited corporations
from contributing to or spending money in connection with a Presidential campaign. Id. at 68. A
unanimous Court ruled that the shareholders had no implied private right of action under the
statute. Id. at 69. •




156. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982); Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-702 (1979).
157. See, e.g., Michigan Hosp. Ass'n, 738 F. Supp. at 1083-84; Suter, 719 F. Supp. at 1425
(finding no evidence of a congressional intent to create a private right of action against the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services under the Boren Amendment).
158. See, e.g., Suter, 719 F. Supp. at 1419; AGI-Bluff Manor, Inc. v. Reagen, 713 F. Supp.
1535, 1545 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (refusing to recognize a property interest entitling providers to proce-
dural due process in rate setting).
159. See CANNAS ET AL., supra note 20, at 165-67.
160. Some providers tried to avoid the issue by asserting Due Process or Equal Protection
violations. Those claims rarely resulted, however, in the overturning of the state scheme under the
Boren Amendment. Cf. Wisconsin Hospital Ass'n v. Reivitz, 630 F. Supp. 1015, 1023-25 (E.D. Wis.
1986) (finding that Wisconson's rate freeze violated the contracts clause of the U.S. Constitution)
aff'd on other grounds, 820 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1987). Folden v. Washington State DSHS, 744 F.
Supp. 1507, 1526-27 (W.D. Wash. 1990); Colorado Health Care Ass'n v. Colorado Dep't of Social
Servs., 598 F. Supp. 1400, 1407 (D. Colo. 1984).
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leave rate setting to the states.161 As provider challenges to state rate-
setting programs continued to proliferate in the 1980s, 162 however, sev-
eral federal circuit courts reversed this trend and ruled that providers
could rely on Section 1983 as a legitimate cause of action.163 Because
the Boren Amendment conditioned federal funding on state assurances
that rates were reasonable and adequate for economically and effi-
ciently operated providers, these courts found that Congress had cre-
ated enforceable rights for providers under the Boren Amendment.
6 4
Moreover, these courts suggested that the HHS Secretary's loose and
limited review of state assurances was not a comprehensive federal re-
view procedure and, thus, would not foreclose a Section 1983 action.,6 5
In short, these courts started with a presumption that the statute gave
providers rights enforceable under Section 1983 and then looked to the
legislative history of the statute for some indication that Congress had
intended to foreclose that remedy. 6 Finding no such indication in the
legislative history, these courts concluded that providers had rights en-
forceable under Section 1983.167
Thus, prior to the Wilder decision, a number of circuit courts had
already begun to reassert federal control over rate-setting under the Bo-
ren Amendment. The circuits' use of Section 1983, coupled with the
Supreme Court's expansion of Section 1983 rights in other areas, cre-
ated the opportunity for the Court to consider providers' claims as stat-
161. See, e.g., Colorado Health Care Ass'n v. Colorado Dep't of Social Servs., 842 F.2d 1159,
1164-66 (10th Cir. 1986) (insisting that states could consider budgetary constraints when setting
reimbursement levels and creating a presumption of validity for state actions under the Boren
Amendment); Friedman v. Perales, 668 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that the federal
courts should not rethink the political and financial considerations that motivated the state's reim-
bursement decision).
162. Providers began to base their suits on § 1983 as a cause of action in order to get federal
court review of state rate-setting decisions. See, e.g., West Virginia University Hosps., Inc. v.
Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 18-22 (3d Cir. 1989); Virginia Hosp. Ass'n v. Baliles, 868 F.2d 653, 656-60 (4th
Cir. 1989); Coos Bay Care Center v. State of Oregon, 803 F.2d 1060, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 1986). But
see Colorado Health Care Ass'n, 842 F.2d at 1163 (linking the providers' rights with patients'
rights).
163. See cases cited supra note 162.
164. See, e.g., Casey, 885 F.2d at 21 (expressing the belief "that Congress's concern with
appropriate hospital reimbursement implies an intent to supply hospitals with an indispensable
right to enforce state compliance with federal standards that, whether strictly or loosely, govern
state reimbursement methodologies").
165. See, e.g., id. at 22; Coos Bay Care Center, 803 F.2d at 1062.
166. See, e.g., Casey, 885 F.2d at 18 (placing the burden on the state to prove congressional
intent to foreclose a § 1983 action); Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 868 F.2d at 658 (finding a § 1983 action
implied in language and legislative history of the Boren Amendment); Coos Bay Care Center, 803
F.2d at 1062 (suggesting that "[a]ccess to a § 1983 remedy should be denied if. . . the language of
the statute indicates a congressional intent to foreclose § 1983 enforcement by making alternative
remedies available").
167. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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utory rights under the Boren Amendment.
IV. WILDER V. VIRGINIA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION
A. The Majority Opinion
In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association,165 the Supreme Court
determined that health care providers have the right to bring Section
1983 claims in federal court under the Boren Amendment.169 According
to the majority, the Amendment confers both substsntive and proce-
dural rights on providers. °7 0 The majority based its decision primarily
on the legislative history of the Amendment and on a presumption that
Section 1983 claims can be brought unless the statute does not create
enforceable rights or Congress specifically foreclosed Section 1983
claims.
17 1
Because the language of the statute discusses providers, the major-
ity first assumed that providers must be the beneficiaries of the stat-
ute.17 2 Although they later conceded that Congress designed the
Amendment to give states greater flexibility in setting reimbursement
rates, the majority never examined the possibility that states and pa-
tients, not providers, may have been the intended beneficiaries of the
Amendment. a73 Nor did they consider that the Boren Amendment is
simply one part of the laundry list of requirements for state Medicaid
plans. 17 4 Far from focusing exclusively on the states' obligations to
providers, the Amendment focuses primarily on the states' responsibili-
ties to the federal government under the Medicaid program. The major-
168. 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990).
169. Id. at 2525. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy,
dissented in Wilder. The dissent relied on the text of the Boren Amendment to conclude that
providers could not assert § 1983 rights for several reasons. 110 S. Ct. 2510, 2525-27 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting). First, the Boren Amendment is part of a laundry list of requirements that state
medical assistance plans must meet for states to receive federal funding. See 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(1988). As such, the dissent concluded that the Amendment was addressed to states rather
than to providers. 110 S. Ct. at 2526 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Second, the Amendment already
contained a process for rate setting. A state must make findings and then provide assurances to the
Secretary of HHS. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13). The dissent recognized that providers might have
a right to force states to adhere to this process, but thought that allowing providers to seek court-
imposed rates would subvert the statutory process and thereby undermine Congress' intent in
passing the Amendment. 110 S. Ct. at 2527 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Thus, the dissent refused
to find any substantive right for providers under the Amendment. Id.
170. Id. at 2517-23.
171. Id. at 2515-17, 2523-25; see also Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479
U.S. 418 (1987) (establishing these criteria for a § 1983 claim).
172. 110 S. Ct. at 2517.
173. Id.
174. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (1988) (listing all the major elements that a state plan must
include to qualify for the federal Medicaid program). The Boren Amendment, 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(13), is merely one of these requirements.
MEDICAID PROVIDER SUITS
ity also seemed to ignore that the primary beneficiaries of Medicaid are
not providers but the eligible poor, elderly, and disabled.17 5 Providers
alone cannot receive Medicaid; they must treat Medicaid patients to
obtain funding. Furthermore, although provider participation in Medi-
caid is entirely voluntary,176 providers are not entitled to participate.
The providers' decision to rely on Medicaid funding should not in itself
be enough to create federal rights.
177
After assuming that providers were the intended beneficiaries of
the Boren Amendment, the majority then rejected the argument that
the statute was too vague or amorphous to create enforceable federal
rights. 178 Instead, the majority found both procedural and substantive
rights for providers: providers could force states to make findings and
provide assurances to the Secretary of HHS and could challenge the
substance of state reimbursement methods.' 79 The majority concluded
that the statute's use of mandatory rather than precatory language cre-
ated clear substantive and procedural obligations.'80 Requiring a state
to make findings without providing a mechanism to review the correct-
ness of those findings would render the statute "a dead letter."' 8 ' Fur-
thermore, the majority argued, because the statute required a state to
evaluate "the reasonableness of its rates against the objective bench-
mark of an 'efficiently and economically' operated facility,' 8 2 the stat-
ute provided courts with a significant yardstick by which to measure
reimbursement. Importantly, that yardstick ultimately belonged to the
federal government, not to the states.' 3
There are several weaknesses in the majority's line of reasoning.
First, most of the litigation arising under the Boren Amendment has
focused on what the majority opinion described as "an objective bench-
mark.''8 The Amendment itself, however, does not even attempt to de-
fine economic and efficient hospitals. 85 Instead, the Amendment leaves
175. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988); see also 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.500-.541"(1991) (outlining the
eligibility requirements for Medicaid).
176. Provider participation is voluntary under the Medicaid program. See supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
177. In Pennhurst a state's voluntary decision to participate in a federal program and to
receive federal funds did not create statutory rights for disabled persons in the state's care. Pen-
nhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 11 (1981).
178. Wilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2518, 2522-23.
179. Id. at 2519-20.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 2520.
182. Id. at 2523.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2523.
185. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (1988). In fact, the section of the Medicaid act that sup-
plies definitions for key terms in the Act does not provide a definition of these terms. See 42
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the task of definition to the states. Yet, if states create the benchmark
by which federal rights exist, a state can violate those federal rights
only by failing to pay hospitals according to the rates the state had
already set - in other words by violating its own benchmark. The
plaintiffs did not allege this violation in Wilder. Instead, they alleged
that the benchmark itself was a violation of federal rights. 186
Second, the majority recognized but failed to accord proper signifi-
cance to the primary purpose of the Amendment. Congress designed
the Amendment to allow states broad flexibility in devising reimburse-
ment plans18 7 and cited the need to move away from federal standards
of reimbursement as a primary motivation for enacting the Amend-
ment.18 8 In fact, Congress viewed the former Medicare reasonable costs
standard that the plaintiffs sought in Wilder as "inherently inflation-
ary" and unacceptable for cost containment in Medicaid.' For these
reasons, in the 1970s Congress rejected an experiment that would have
opened the federal courts to these claims' 90 and instead resorted to
state control of Medicaid rates.'"'
Despite this evidence of congressional intent to the contrary, the
majority not only found that providers could bring a Section 1983
claim, but also allowed the providers to seek temporary imposition of
alternate Medicare reimbursement standards on the states. 92 Thus, the
Court actually created federal standards in order to grant plaintiffs re-
lief under Section 1983. This decision, then, is substantially different
and a substantial departure from the Court's decisions in Wright 9" and
Golden State Transit Corp.'-" In Wright the Court found that tenant
rights to limited utility regulations were enforceable under Section 1983
U.S.C. § 1396d (1988).
186. Virginia's formula for reimbursement used the median costs of care for peer groups of
hospitals in 1982 as its base reimbursement level. The state then readjusted that base annually for
inflation. The provider-plaintiffs in Wilder challenged the methods Virginia used to calculate me-
dian 1982 costs, the use of the consumer price index instead of a factor tied to medical costs to
adjust for inflation from 1982 to 1986, and the use of an allegedly inadequate medical cost index
factor to adjust for inflation after 1986. See Wilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2514 n.3.
187. Wilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2514 (noting the respondent's contention that "Virginia's plan for
reimbursement violates the Medicaid Act because the 'rates are not reasonable and adequate' ").
188. See H.R. REP. No. 158, supra note 68, at 294; S. REP. No. 139, supra note 77, at 742-44.
189. S. REP. No. 139, supra note 77, at 748.
190. Interestingly, in 1975, Congress toyed with the idea of giving the federal judiciary
greater control over Medicaid rates by adopting an amendment requiring states to waive Eleventh
Amendment protection against suits by providers in federal court. Pub. L. No. 94-182, § 111, 89
Stat. 1051, 1054 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.CA-N. 2125. That law was repealed the next year.
See Pub. L. No. 92-552, 90 Stat. 2540 (1976).
191. See supra part II.B.
192. Wilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2514.
193. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
194. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 110 S. Ct. 444 (1989).
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because HUD had promulgated regulations delineating the scope of
that right.'9 5 In Golden State Transit, the statute explicitly declared
congressional intent to create rights for both employees and employ-
ers. 9 ' In both cases, the Court demonstrated far more concern for ex-
isting federal regulations and explicit statutory language than it
demonstrated in Wilder.
B. The Ramifications of Wilder
The Wilder decision already has begun to influence provider suits
in the lower federal courts.'9 7 These post-Wilder decisions demonstrate
that the creation of both procedural and substantive federal rights for
providers under the Boren Amendment is likely to have several nega-
tive consequences for both the federal and state governments. First, the
decision may make the Medicaid program more difficult to administer.
Second, it may defeat cost-containment initiatives in the states. Finally,
the Wilder decision may pave the way for a significant expansion of the
scope of Section 1983 rights.
1. Difficulty in Medicaid Administration
Because the Wilder decision is likely to encourage new provider
suits and to prolong already existing suits, it clearly will complicate the
states' task of developing and administering Medicaid reimbursement
schemes. In New York, for example, Wilder has given nursing homes
new ammunition in their five-year old fight with the state over reim-
bursement rules.19 8 As a result, both sides face further long and poten-
tially costly litigation.
The provider suit in Pinnacle Nursing Home v. Axelrod"9 arose
after the State of New York attempted to adjust its reimbursement
rates in 1987.200 Because certain providers felt that the new rates
helped nursing homes with high wage costs and hurt those with low
wage costs, these providers sued New York officials seeking to prevent
the new rates from taking effect.20' After extensive litigation in both
state and federal courts, a federal district court ruled that the state had
195. Wright, 479 U.S. at 430.
196. Golden State Transit, 110 S. Ct. at 450.
197. See, e.g., Pinnacle Nursing Home v. Axelrod, 928 F.2d 1306 (2d Cir. 1991); Kansas
Health Care Ass'n v. Kansas Dep't of Social & Rehabilitation Servs., 754 F. Supp. 1502 (D. Kan.
1990); Ohio Academy of Nursing Homes, Inc. v. Berry, 654 N.E.2d 686 (Ohio 1990). All three cases
evaluate state Medicaid rates in light of Wilder.
198. See id.
199. 928 F.2d 1306 (2d Cir. 1991).
200. Id. at 1310-11.
201. Id. at 1311.
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failed to make adequate findings and had not provided legitimate assur-
ances to the federal government as required by the Boren Amend-
ment.20 2 Because the state had failed to comply with these procedural
requirements, the district court suspended the new reimbursement
plan.
203
The district court, however, refused to reach the issue of whether
the new rates met the substantive requirement of the Boren Amend-
ment.20 4 Instead, the court dismissed the providers' claims that the
rates were not reasonable and adequate in deference to the discretion
granted the states under the Boren Amendment to determine their own
Medicaid plans.20 5
Relying on the Wilder decision, the Second Circuit reinstated the
providers' substantive claims on appeal and remanded the case for fur-
ther proceedings. 20 6 This decision has paved the way for a continuing
legal battle between providers and the state.20 7 As a result, New York
may not know whether its 1987 plan meets the Boren Amendment re-
quirements until well into the year 1992.
The Wilder Court was certainly aware of the delays and uncertain-
ties the decision might create. Forty-five states filed an amicus curiae
brief in the Wilder case, in part because of their concern about difficult,
protracted litigation over rates. 20 The states urged the Court not to
allow substantive challenges to provider rates under Section 1983. They
feared that the Court's recognition of Section 1983 provider claims
would create a dual system of review.09 Under the current federal regu-
lations, states already must create a fairly substantial system of review
for reimbursement rates.210 Not only must states make findings that
rates are reasonable and adequate and, at a minimum, submit annual
assurances to the Secretary of HHS, but states also must conduct plan
approvals, audits, and policy reviews. 11 Current federal regulations also
require states to develop appeals procedures for individual providers.21 2
Most states have developed extensive review procedures. 13 Prior to
202. Id. at 1311-12.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1312.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1318.
207. Id. at 1308 (remanding the case to the district court with an instruction to reinstate the
claims).
208. See Amicus Curiae Brief for Connecticut et al. at v-vi, Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n,
110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990) (No. 88-2043).
209. Id. at 1.
210. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 447.250, 447.253 (1990).
211. Id.
212. 42 C.F.R. § 447.253(c) (1990).
213. See Amicus Curiae Brief for the National Governor's Ass'n and the Nat'l Ass'n of Coun-
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the Wilder suit, for example, Virginia had developed a several-hundred
page state plan outlining Medicaid reimbursement procedures and cov-
erage.-14 Virginia also had well-defined appeals procedures. Individual
providers could appeal reimbursement decisions first to an administra-
tive body and then through two levels of the Virginia court system by
right.215 Arguably, the Virginia Court of Appeals developed a significant
amount of expertise in Medicaid reimbursement because it usually had
final authority over these suits.218 As a final resort, unsatisfied providers
could seek review of the appellate court decision in the Virginia Su-
preme Court.
217
Other states have similarly comprehensive review procedures.2 18
State courts also have shown no hesitance to entertain claims of inade-
quate reimbursement under the Boren Amendment.21 Massachusetts
courts, for example, struck down state reimbursement rates when the
state failed to prove that the rates were reasonable and adequate and
also failed to make assurances to the Secretary of HHS.22 ° Moreover,
the Massachusetts Supreme Court was willing to grant more than in-
junctive relief to the providers. The court decided that the hospitals
challenging the new reimbursement rates were entitled to reimburse-
ment under the previously approved rate as though that rate had re-
mained in effect throughout the entire dispute.2 21
The Wilder decision undermines the effectiveness and comprehen-
siveness of these state review procedures. It essentially gives providers
ties at 6-8, Wilder (No. 88-2043) (stating that creation of substantive § 1983 rights under the
Boren Amendment would produce litigation disrupting the federal-state relationship and would
expose states to heavy potential liability). See also Amicus Curiae Brief for Connecticut et al. at
vii.
214. See Virginia's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Wilder (No. 88-1043).
215. Id.
216. See id. at 13-14.
217. If Virginia's scheme had any defects, those defects were most obvious in the Wilder
case. Virginia review procedures did not allow class action challenges like the one brought in Wil-
der. Nor did they allow providers to challenge the entire scheme of reimbursement. See Virginia
Hosp. Ass'n v. Bafles, 868 F.2d 653, 661 (4th Cir. 1989). In Wilder, the VHA used a class action
suit to challenge Virginia's use of the Consumer Price Index in calculating rates state-wide. See
Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510, 2514 n.3 (1990). Perhaps this defect, however,
merely points out the need for more complete state administrative review procedures. Virginia's
existing review framework easily could have handled such a claim.
218. See, e.g., New England Memorial Hosp. v. Rate Setting Comm'n, 475 N.E.2d 740, 742-
43 (Mass. 1985) (describing Massachusetts' rate-setting procedures); St. Michael Hosp. v. Thomp-
son, 725 F. Supp. 1038, 1040-41 (W.D. Wisc. 1989) (outlining Wisconsin's procedures).
219. See, e.g., Geriatrics, Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Social Servs., 712 P.2d 1035 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1985); Ohio Hosp. Ass'n v. Ohio Dep't of Human Servs., No. 88AP-1034, 1990 Ohio App.
LEXIS 2587 (Ohio Ct. App. June 21, 1990); Volk v. Department of Human Resources, 799 P.2d
658 (Or. Ct. App. 1990).
220. New England Memorial Hosp., 475 N.E.2d at 744-45.
221. Id. at 745.
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an alternative method of challenging reimbursement rates. Even if
providers' challenges have failed under the state's administrative review
mechanisms, providers subsequently may challenge the same payment
schemes in federal court. Thus, states that have complied with the pro-
cedures of the Boren Amendment, made findings, and received approval
from the Secretary of HHS nonetheless may be subject to judicial re-
view as well.2 2
Because no concrete criteria or objective reimbursement standards
exist under the Amendment, states cannot predict what federal courts
will decide are reasonable and adequate rates.2 Significant local varia-
tions in factors that contribute to hospital costs will increase this uncer-
tainty.2 24 Local variations in wages, food costs, utility costs, the amount
of uncompensated care, and other operational costs may make rates
that are reasonable in one state unreasonable in another.225 Thus, the
inability of states to rely on absolute standards of reasonableness in the
determination of reimbursement rates will add to the uncertainty of the
federal review.
2. The Inhibition of State Cost-Containment Innovation
Not only does the creation of a dual system of review add substan-
tial uncertainty to a state's reimbursement decisions, it also may inhibit
state efforts to develop innovative cost-containment measures. 26 Prov-
iders will be less likely to challenge new methods of reimbursement if
they vary only slightly from old methods. Thus, a state whose current
scheme reimburses fully up to the eightieth percentile may be more
likely to cut costs simply by reimbursing up to only the seventy-eighth
percentile rather than by trying new and ultimately more efficient
222. See supra part IV.A.
223. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., Washington State Nurses Ass'n v. Washington State Hasp. Comm'n, 773 F.2d
1044 (9th Cir. 1985) (involving a plaintiff who alleged that state rate-setting procedures were not
flexible enough to allow hospitals to pay adequate wage increases); see also Wing, supra note 30, at
628-35.
225. See Mark S. Freeland et al., Measuring Hospital Input Price Increases: The Rebased
Hospital Market Basket, HEALTH CARE FINANCING RE v., Spring 1991, at 1, 2-3 (discussing how
variable input costs are measured in Medicare and how those costs change over time); E. Greer
Gay, The Rural Health Care Markets: Strategies for Survival, HEALTH SPAN, Feb. 1990, at 11, 11-
15 (discussing the unique needs of rural hospitals).
226. Critics of the Illinois scheme have raised two objections to the plan. First, the plan
places hospitals in a position of having to make a price versus volume tradeoff. Hospitals can keep
their prices high and accept fewer Medicaid patients, or they can lower prices and accept more
Medicaid patients. Neither choice, however, is a guaranty that hospitals will increase profitability.
Second, the plan may force patients to travel significant distances from their homes to attain care.
Because fewer patients are apt to travel to receive health care, the scheme may affect negatively




Unfortunately, old methods of cost containment may not work in
the 1990s. Many of the factors that have contributed to the current fi-
nancial difficulties in the Medicaid system will likely worsen in the
1990s.2 2 1 Although regulation slowed the rise of medical costs in the
1980s, it did not curtail cost increases. Costs continued to rise faster
than general inflation.228 In the 1990s, costs should continue to rise as
the baby boom generation enters its fifties and America, as a whole,
grows older. Elderly Americans generally require more medical care
than their younger counterparts.229 In addition, AIDS patients and new-
born children with drug addictions are likely to continue demanding a
significant amount of medical resources.230 With mounting federal
budget deficits, Congress is unlikely to increase federal funding to ease
the Medicaid burden on states.31
In the mid-1980s some states tried innovative measures to contain
medical costs. Illinois, for example, established a voucher system that
allocated Medicaid patient days to hospitals.232 By bargaining down
their rates, however, providers could receive more patient days than
hospitals with higher rates. Only after a hospital reached its patient-day
limit was it restricted to treating Medicaid patients in emergency situa-
tions.33 Other states sought to enroll Medicaid patients in programs of
managed care. Under managed care systems, patients chose a particular
physician to act as a primary care provider. That physician then con-
trolled the patient's choice of hospitals and other health care
providers.3
The uncertainty of federal review should make states less willing to
enact these kinds of innovative cost-containment measures. By enacting
such measures, the states almost certainly will face the prospect of de-
fending their Medicaid programs in federal court. Numerous suits
would add significant administrative costs to the institution of new pro-
227. See infra notes 228-230 and accompanying text.
228. See Jack Hadley & Katherine Swartz, The Impacts on Hospital Costs Between 1980
and 1984 of Hospital Rate Regulation, Competition, and Changes in Health Insurance Coverage,
26 INQUIRY 35 (1989).
229. Wing, supra note 30, at 643; see also CANNAS ET AL., supra note 20, at 123.
230. Dennis Andrulis et al., The Provision and Financing of Medical Care for AIDS Pa-
tients in U.S. Public and Private Teaching Hospitals, 258 J.A.M.A. 1343 (1987).
231. In fact, Congress has been looking for ways to trim even more fat from the Medicaid
budget. See Robert Pear, U.S. Moves to Curb Medicaid Payments for Many States, N.Y. TIMEs,
Sept. 11, 1991, at Al, A16, for an example of the current political climate.
232. See Salmon et al., supra note 53, at 103-05.
233. Id. at 106-08.
234. See Rand E. Rosenblatt, Medicaid Primary Care Case Management, the Doctor-Pa-
tient Relationship, and the Politics of Privatization, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 915, 918-19 (1986).
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grams. 2 5 Furthermore, providers who win injunctions under Section
1983 may force states to abandon new, innovative programs and to re-
imburse providers, at least temporarily, under the older, ineffective pro-
grams. And, if courts follow Wilder literally, providers may be able to
obtain interim reimbursement under more costly Medicare guidelines
until the state can adopt new Medicaid schemes.3 6 Thus, instead of
controlling costs, an innovative program invalidated through a Section
1983 claim actually could increase the costs to the state. Clearly, the
possibility of such a result should make states less willing to reduce or
limit provider reimbursement rates in an attempt to control costs. In-
stead, states may continue to use more traditional, but less efficient,
less patient-favoring cost-control measures.
The Wilder decision also threatens the continuation of already-in-
stituted state programs that expand the minimum coverage required by
federal law. Although some federal requirements exist as to the scope of
Medicaid coverage, states retain significant freedom in delineating the
types of procedures state Medicaid programs will cover. The federal
government merely requires participating states to provide certain
types of services to "categorically needy" persons.237 States also can
choose to provide services to "medically needy" individuals whose in-
come has been depleted by catastrophic medical expenses.2 38 In addi-
tion, any state may opt to pay for more than the basic services.23 9 Thus,
states are free to develop programs that are significantly more compre-
hensive than the federally required base. Many state programs, for ex-
ample, currently cover prescription drugs, dental care, nursing home
services, rehabilitation, and optical care2 0 even though federal Medi-
caid legislation does not demand that states reimburse providers for
these services.241 States usually also cover nursing home services in in-
termediate care facilities despite the fact that this optional coverage
may represent forty to fifty percent of Medicaid expenses.242
States that cannot contain Medicaid costs by adjusting provider re-
imbursement schemes, however, may begin to curtail the scope of their
235. See Virginia Hop. Ass'n v. Baliles, 868 F.2d 653, 660 n.7 (4th Cir. 1989) (reflecting
judicial recognition of this problem).
236. See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510, 2514-15 (1990).
237. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1988); 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.100-.139 (1990) (outlining the
scope of Medicaid coverage in great detail); see also Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34
(1981) (outlining federal requirements for Medicaid eligibility).
238. 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.300-.350.
239. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.200-.350 (1990) (detailing the types of care that Medicaid must
provide and the types of optional care states also may choose to provide).
240. See CANNAS Er AL., supra note 20, at 184.
241. See 45 C.F.R. § 244.10(a)(5)(i) (1990).
242. See CANNAS ET AL., supra note 20, at 184.
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coverage. A state may decide, for example, to eliminate coverage of op-
tical care or to reduce coverage of intermediate facility nursing home
care. As a result, post-Wilder Medicaid recipients are likely to find
health care growing less accessible in the 1990s.243
3. The Further Expansion of Section 1983 Rights
The Wilder decision also has negative ramifications for the federal
government. Creating a Section 1983 right under the Boren Amend-
ment forces federal courts to make open-ended adjudicatory decisions
about Medicaid reimbursement."" Courts now must determine the
scope of a federal right under language that provides few specific guide-
lines.24 '5 The Boren Amendment requires only that providers receive
rates that are reasonable and adequate for an economically and effi-
ciently operated facility.246 The Amendment does not set guidelines for
determining what rates are reasonable, nor does it explain how courts
should determine when a hospital is operated economically and effi-
ciently.247 Worse still, these definitions are mired easily in the shifting
sands of variable costs. Each hospital faces a unique mix of labor, util-
ity, charitable care, and technology costs. 248 Reasonable reimbursement
for one hospital may be unreasonable for another. No discrete oasis of
reasonable rates exists.
Although Wilder involves challenges to state action under Section
1983 rather than challenges to agency action, the state, in many re-
spects, acts as a substitute for a federal agency under the Medicaid pro-
gram. The state sets the rates, determines some eligibility, and
generally administers the Medicaid program.2 49 Thus, administrative
law may provide the best guide for how courts should approach such an
open-ended, technical decision. °
In reviewing administrative determinations of questions of law,
such as whether a given rate conforms to the Boren Amendment, courts
243. See White v. Beal, 555 F.2d 1146 (3d Cir. 1977) (involving Pennsylvania's decision to
cover optional eye care).
244. See James A. Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of
Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976) (outlining the dangers of open-ended adjudication in the field of torts).
245. See supra part II.B.
246. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1989).
247. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
248. See supra part II.A.
249. For a discussion of Medicaid, see supra part II.A. For a general list of some of the
states' responsibilities under the Medicaid program, see 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (1988).
250. At least one court already has indicated that it will judge any challenge to rates under
an arbitrary and capricious standard. See Friedman v. Perales, 668 F. Supp. 216, 221 (S.D.N.Y.
1987). The district court decided that it would review the rates only under an arbitrary and capri-
cious standard. Under that standard, any rates that fell within a zone of reasonableness would be
upheld by the court. Id.
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usually invoke the Chevron test.251 Under that test, a court will uphold
an agency decision unless the agency has either (1) contravened clear
congressional intent or (2) acted in an arbitrary and capricious man-
ner.2 52 Good faith attempts at rate setting by states clearly would not
contravene congressional intent under the Amendment.25 3 Thus, courts
probably would use the second prong of the Chevron test to review
state rate setting. The second prong recognizes the congressional dele-
gation of authority to the agency and the development of agency exper-
tise and, thus, is somewhat deferential. 54 Under the second prong of
the Chevron test, an agency merely must provide reasonable explana-
tions for its decision and demonstrate that it considered alternatives.
255
The Chevron test clearly resembles the standards that states must
meet already under the Boren Amendment. States must provide assur-
ances to the Secretary of the HHS that the chosen rates are reasonable
and adequate..25  Thus, arguably, a court's review of Medicaid reim-
bursement rates under Chevron should merely duplicate the review of
the Secretary of HHS. The court should focus only on the exact same
issue that the Secretary decided: whether the state provided adequate
assurances. But this review translates into more of a procedural right
than a substantive right. 57 It may give providers the right to make sure
a state follows the procedures of the Boren Amendment, but it does not
translate into a right to receive any particular reimbursement.
The Wilder decision, however, suggests a more active role for
courts in Section 1983 provider cases. The Court allowed the providers
to seek court-ordered reimbursement at new rates.2 8 This relief is in-
consistent with the Chevron approach. For a court to set reimburse-
ment rates, it must make its own independent evaluation of what the
reasonable and adequate standard mandates rather than, as Chevron
would suggest, simply review the state's determination of that standard.
Moreover, any court that substitutes its own rates for those of the
state arguably violates the position of the Supreme Court in SEC v.
Chenery.259 In Chenery, the SEC decided that common-law agency
251. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
252. Id. at 842-43.
253. See supra part II.B. for a discussion of congressional intent.
254. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
255. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 463 U.S. 29, 56-57
(1983).
256. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (1988).
257. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 57 (noting that, in making a decision, an agency "must supply a
reasoned analysis").
258. Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510, 2514-15, 2525 (1990).
259. SEC v. Chenery 318 U.S. 80, 93-94 (1943) (stating that the SEC's action "must be mea-
sured by what the Commissioner did, not by what it might have done").
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principles prohibited directors of a corporation from trading stock dur-
ing the corporation's reorganization.260 The Court found no justification
for such a rule in the common law.261 Significantly, however, the Court
refused to substitute its own rationale for the SEC rule. 62 Instead, it
remanded the dispute to the SEC for further clarification.6 3
Many of the considerations that led to the Chenery decision are
applicable in the Wilder context. Courts have less expertise than state
agencies in setting rates, and federal courts, in particular, may be less
politically accountable.6 4 Instead of following the Chenery rule, how-
ever, Wilder seems to condone the plaintiffs' request for court-ordered
rates.26 5 Thus, unlike Chenery, the decision invites lower courts to sub-
stitute their judgment for that of the states. The Court thereby de-
creased the ability of states to predict the likelihood that their
Medicaid rates will withstand judicial scrutiny. In so doing, it raised a
legitimate question as to why states, acting as surrogate federal agen-
cies, do not deserve as much respect as bona fide federal agencies, par-
ticularly in an area like Medicaid where the states probably have
greater expertise than do courts. 66
In addition to allowing federal courts to substitute their own judg-
ment for that of state legislatures and agencies, the Wilder decision also
seems to broaden the scope of the Section 1983 right available to puta-
tive plaintiffs by creating substantial uncertainty at the borders of the
Supreme Court's analytical framework for whether a Section 1983 right
exists under a particular statute. Although the Supreme Court clearly
expanded the scope of Section 1983 rights under federal statutes in the
past decade, the Court seemed to have developed a workable three-part
test for the existence of that right in the Pennhurst,
6 7 Wright,268
Golden State, 2 9 and Dennis2 70 decisions.27 1 Although this test may ex-
260. Id. at 87-88.
261. Id. at 89.
262. Id. at 93-95.
263. Id. at 95.
264. Id. at 94-95 (recognizing congressional delegation and agency expertise).
265. Wilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2515, 2525.
266. See St. Michael Hosp. v. Thompson, 725 F. Supp. 1038, 1043-44 (W.D. Wis. 1989) (in-
voking the Burford abstention doctrine in recognition of state expertise in this area).
267. Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19 (1980) (stating that the right was
too vague and amorphous because plaintiffs based their suit on a provision that contained congres-
sional findings and did not create any obligations).
268. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 419, 430-32 (1987) (stat-
ing that a § 1983 cause of action existed unless Congress foreclosed such an action or unless the
statute did not create enforceable rights for the plaintiff).
269. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 105-07 (1989) (af-
firming the two-step analysis in Pennhurst and Wright).
270. Dennis v. Higgins, 111 S. Ct. 865 (1991).
271. The Court summarized the three earlier cases in the three-part test it enunciated in
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plain the Supreme Court's decisions in many of its prior Section 1983
cases, it does not explain the Wilder decision. Arguably, an attempt by
health care providers to assert Section 1983 rights under the Medicaid
statute should fail all three parts of the test.
First, the Boren Amendment may not create substantive obliga-
tions on the states.2 72 The obligations the Amendment imposes on the
states are largely procedural. The Amendment requires states t6 make
findings and to provide assurances to the federal government that its
reimbursement rates are reasonable and adequate for efficient and eco-
nomically run facilities,2 73 but the statute provides no substantive man-
date telling states exactly what those rates should be. It does not, for
example, require that states reimburse providers X dollars per patient.
The Amendment requires only that the states satisfy themselves that
the rates are adequate.274
Second, the right that providers assert under the Boren Amend-
ment is quintessentially vague and amorphous.2 7 5 Even assuming that
providers properly could claim a substantive right to reimbursement,
the language of the Amendment suggests that the Court should have
found this right too vague to be enforceable under Section 1983.276 The
Amendment merely requires reimbursements to be "reasonable and ad-
equate" for an "efficient and economically operated" health care facil-
ity.277 But what is an efficient and economically operated facility?
Teaching hospitals, rural hospitals, inner-city hospitals, small clinics,
and specialized health care facilities may have widely varying systems
of operation. 278 A hospital that regularly performs organ transplants
may have significantly higher per-patient operating costs than a small
rural clinic. 279 But is one more efficient than the other? To determine
Dennis, 111 S. Ct. at 871; see also supra notes 137-141 and accompanying text.
272. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (1988) (providing the language of the Boren Amendment).
See, for example, the Court's consideration of the Developmental Disability Act in Pennhurst, 451
U.S. at 13-15 (concluding that the Patient's Bill of Rights contains no binding obligations); see
also Developmentally Disabled Assistance & Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-103, § 201, 89 Stat.
486, 502 (1975) (current version codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6009 (1988)).
273. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13).
274. Id.
275. See supra notes 266-70 and accompanying text.
276. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13).
277. Id.
278. See Vladeck, supra note 49, at 581-84 (suggesting that these variations may produce
significant differences in the cost of treating a particular illness). Presumably, cost variations
would still exist regardless of whether Medicaid or Medicare paid for treatment.
279. The costs and difficulties associated with procuring organ transplants have led some
commentators to propose rationing this type of care. See George J. Annas, The Prostitute, the
Playboy, and the Poet: Rationing Schemes for Organ Transplants, 75 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 187
(1985); see also Marc Roberts, The Economics of Organ Transplants, 25 JURIMErRICS J. 256 (1985)
(discussing the costs of organ transplants in the early 1980s).
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efficiency, a court could restrict its comparisons to facilities that had
similar patient populations and provided similar services. This method,
however, still would fail to take account of an enormous number of
other economic variables that affect a hospital's operating costs. Wage
costs, for example, are often different in various parts of the country. 80
Likewise, utility, food, and waste-disposal costs also may vary from re-
gion to region.281
Even assuming that a court could accurately account for all these
factors by comparing a provider with similar providers in the same geo-
graphic locality,282 the court still must determine which providers are
efficient and economically operated. Again, the Amendment is devoid of
guidelines. Are eighty percent of providers in a given group efficient?
Are ninety percent efficient? How should the court decide?
Furthermore, even-if a court is able to determine which providers
are efficient and economically operated, it still must determine what
constitutes reasonable and adequate reimbursement for these provid-
ers. 283 Once again, the Boren Amendment provides no guidance for a
court endeavoring to solve this puzzle. Is an eighty percent reimburse-
ment reasonable because the hospital easily can offset any losses by
charging non-Medicaid patients more? Is a ninety percent reimburse-
ment adequate? Should reimbursement rates be adjusted once a month,
once a year, or once every two years? Neither the Boren Amendment
nor its legislative history provide any answers to these questions. The
Amendment, then, leaves a court with very few signposts in its quest to
evaluate reimbursement rates.
The net result is that when a court strikes down a state reimburse-
ment scheme it necessarily substitutes its own policy decisions for the
state's policy decisions. Even if, upon striking down a particular reim-
bursement scheme, the court allows the state to adopt substitute rates,
the court still has made a policy decision that the initial reimbursement
scheme was unsatisfactory. A court cannot simply enforce a provider's
rights under the Boren Amendment; it must create those rights out of
vague and amorphous statutory language.
Finally, health care providers asserting Section 1983 rights under
280. In fact, statewide reimbursement limits sometimes have affected hospital wage scales.
See Washington State Nurses Ass'n v. Washington State Hosp. Comm'n, 773 F.2d 1044 (9th Cir.
1985) (involving plaintiffs who argued that Medicaid reimbursement procedures impinged on their
right to negotiate wage increases).
281. For a discussion of variable input costs, how they may change over time, and how Medi-
care measures them, see Freeland et al., supra note 225, at 2-3.
282. This approach would result in using a market basket method similar to Medicare to
evaluate the input costs for various types of hospitals in different geographic regions. See id. (dis-
cussing the variations in input costs for hospitals and the market basket approach in Medicare).
283. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (1988).
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the Boren Amendment apparently also convinced the Wilder Court
that they were the intended beneficiaries of the Amendment. 284 This
result, however, is far from obvious. As the legislative history makes
clear, Congress enacted the Amendment to give states greater flexibility
in setting reimbursement rates.28 5 Moreover, the Medicaid statute itself
was intended to provide health care for the poor, not to ensure the fis-
cal well-being of providers.26 Thus, providers, at best, are only tangen-
tial beneficiaries of the statutory scheme.
The Supreme Court's decision to confer Section 1983 rights on
health care providers, then, seems incongruous with the analytical
framework the Court has established for determining the existence of
statutory Section 1983 rights.87 Because the Wilder decision seems to
ignore many of the principles that limit Section 1983 rights, principles
that the Court has recognized in other statutory cases,2 8 it extends an
invitation to plaintiffs to press the Court to develop new Section 1983
rights in different contexts under other statutes. It also forces states to
seek new avenues of protection from their increasing vulnerability to
Section 1983 -claims.
V. PRESERVING STATE FREEDOM: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND
JUDICIAL LIMITS ON PROVIDER ACTIONS
Allowing providers to bring substantive Section 1983 claims means
that federal courts have reasserted some control over state rate-setting
procedures. The more control federal courts assert, however, the more
difficult it may become for states, facing the uncertainty of litigation
and its potential negative financial consequences, to experiment with
innovative cost-control measures. Nevertheless, through the creative
use of doctrine limiting federal court jurisdiction, states planning new
reimbursement schemes still may be able to limit the damage Wilder
does to their ability to implement cost-containment measures. By as-
tute planning, states may retain some of the flexibility Congress in-
tended to give them under the Boren Amendment.
A. Eleventh Amendment Limitations
Although the language of the Eleventh Amendment specifically
bars only suits against a state brought in federal court by citizens of
284. See supra notes 266-70 and accompanying text.
'285. See supra part II.B.
286. See supra notes 20-21.
287. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990).
288. See supra part III.A.
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another state, 89 the Supreme Court has interpreted the amendment as
a much more significant preservation of a state's sovereign immunity to
federal court jurisdiction.290 The Court long has held that the Eleventh
Amendment also prohibits federal jurisdiction over suits by citizens of
the defendant state.2 9' This ban applies whether the plaintiff seeks eq-
uitable or legal relief.
L2 92
The Supreme Court, however, also has created a broad exception to
this sweeping immunity. In Ex Parte Young29 3 the Court allowed a suit
against a state attorney general who continued to enforce a statute that
previously had been declared unconstitutional.2 9 4 In refusing to find an
Eleventh Amendment bar to the suit, the Court stated that when "an
unconstitutional state statute is void," actions taken under the auspices
of that statute cannot be considered official actions deserving of immu-
nity under the Eleventh Amendment.295 In 1982, the Court extended
the Ex Parte Young exception to acts of state officials for which the
underlying authorization was merely illegal rather than
unconstitutional.296
Although Ex Parte Young significantly reduced state sovereign im-
munity under the Eleventh Amendment, the Court has retained some
limits on a plaintiff's ability to bring suit against state officials in fed-
eral court. Perhaps the most significant limit stems from the Court's
ruling in Edelman v. Jordan.29 7 In Edelman, the plaintiffs sued Illinois
officials who allegedly failed to deliver the plaintiffs' disability assis-
tance checks..29  The plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring the state
officials to deliver the checks on time in the future.2 9 The plaintiffs also
requested that the Court order the state to pay damages for all past
benefits the plaintiffs had not received.300 Although the Court granted
the injunction, it refused to assess damages for the plaintiffs' lost bene-
289. U.S. CONST., amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prose-
cuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State." Id.
290. See William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against
Jurisdiction, 35 STANFORD L. REV. 1033 (1983) (providing a helpful overview of the Supreme
Court's struggle to interpret the Eleventh Amendment).
291. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
292. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
293. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
294. Id. at 143.
295. Id. at 159-60.
296. Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982).
297. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
298. Id. at 653.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 656.
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fits.301 Thus, the Edelman decision indicated that a plaintiff could seek
prospective or injunctive relief without encountering Eleventh Amend-
ment limitations but could not seek retroactive damages or monetary
relief against a state without encountering the Eleventh Amendment
bar.3
02
Since the Edelman decision, the Court steadfastly has refused to
allow plaintiffs to seek relief against states if that relief addresses com-
pensatory interests.30 3 According to the Court, such suits place an unac-
ceptable burden on state treasuries and, therefore, violate principles of
federalism.30 4 Thus, plaintiffs, in general, may seek prospective relief in
federal court, but they may not seek retrospective relief against a
state.30 5
B. Limiting Provider Suits
Health care providers, then, generally may seek declaratory or in-
junctive relief in Section 1983 suits based on the Boren Amendment.
They may request, for example, that a federal court order a state to
forego implementation of a particular reimbursement scheme. Provid-
ers, however, generally may not recover compensatory damages under
Section 1983 by alleging that state reimbursement rates in the past
were too low. Thus, although a federal court may be willing to strike
down a reimbursement scheme, it cannot order the state to pay dam-
ages for its failure to compensate providers adequately in the past
under existing schemes.
When a court invalidates an old reimbursement scheme, the crucial
question, of course, becomes how providers will be compensated in the
future. The answer, at least in many cases, has been that providers usu-
ally request a return to a prior reimbursement policy - at least until
301. Id. at 664.
302. Id. at 664-68.
303. See, e.g., Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277 (1986) (stating that the Eleventh Amend-
ment bars retroactive relief against a state); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (same);
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289-90 (1977) (same).
304. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 277.
305. Most providers bringing suit under § 1983 have sought only prospective relief. Usually,
the provider will request either an injunction preventing the state from instituting a reimburse-
ment scheme or declaratory relief in which a court declares that the state reimbursement scheme
violates the Boren Amendment. See, e.g., St. Michael Hosp. v. Thompson, 725 F. Supp. 1038, 1039
(W.D. Wis. 1989) (plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief); Illinois Health Care Ass'n v.
Suter, 719 F. Supp. 1419, 1422 (N.D. Il. 1989) (plaintiffs sought only a declaratory judgment that
rates were not appropriate). In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71
n.10 (1989), the Supreme Court found that the state and state officials were not persons when sued
for retrospective relief in state court under § 1983. As a result, providers may be able to seek only




the state can devise a new policy.306 Courts who find flaws in a current
reimbursement policy probably are more likely to grant such a request
than to devise a new reimbursement scheme on their own. 30 7 Returning
to an old scheme allows the court to avoid making the fact based,
highly specific, highly technical decisions that the development of a new
plan would require. Thus, granting this type of relief eliminates the
need for the court to delve into an area of social policy in which it has
little expertise. In addition, using an old plan reduces judicial costs.
The court does not need to spend its already over-burdened resources
devising a new reimbursement scheme when an acceptable, previously-
used scheme already exists.
This result suggests that states may maintain greater control of
their Medicaid policy and programs through strategic implementation
of cost-cutting measures. By implementing an overall reimbursement
scheme in several small stages, each of which could stand independently
as a reimbursement scheme, the state may be able to preserve at least
some of its cost-cutting measures.
Suppose, for example, that a state reimburses hospitals according
to the average costs for an average patient with a particular type of
illness. The state would classify patients by illness into categories, often
called diagnostically related groups, and then would set reimbursement
rates for each diagnostically related group. Such rates also might vary
according to the type of facility providing the treatment. 0 8
Now suppose the state wanted to reduce its reimbursement rates to
providers from eighty percent of the average hospital costs per patient
in each diagnostically related group to seventy percent of these average
costs. If the state simply adopted the entire reduction in one stage,
providers might be tempted to mount a challenge. If the providers won
their challenge in federal court, the judge easily could declare a return
to the old eighty percent rates. If the state, however, accomplished this
change over five years by enacting separate, smaller reduction measures
cutting reimbursement two percent each year, the state actually would
have enacted five independent reimbursement schemes. Providers thus
would be forced to challenge the first reduction to seventy-eight percent
306. See, e.g., Wilmac Corp. v. Heckler, 633 F. Supp. 1000 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Volk v. Depart-
ment of Human Resources, 799 P.2d 658, 659 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (involving plaintiffs requesting
installation of previous rates).
307. See supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
308. The example assumes a state reimburses providers under a system similar to the Medi-
care system. Thus, the state would determine the length of a typical hospital stay and the relative
expenses of an average patient with a particular disease. It might then reimburse the hospital for
this average length of stay - also taking into account the average daily costs of similar hospitals.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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to keep rates at eighty percent.30 9 Otherwise, successful provider chal-
lenges to later reductions would leave the judge with the option of rein-
stating the "old" seventy-eight percent rate. For example, a judge
striking down the third-year reduction from seventy-six to seventy-four
percent reimbursement still may allow old rates of seventy-six percent
or seventy-eight percent to act as a substitute for the seventy-four per-
cent reimbursement scheme. Thus, the state still might achieve at least
part of its cost-cutting goal.
Just as importantly, piecemeal cost cutting may help a state build a
record of compliance with the Boren Amendment. Under the Amend-
ment, the Secretary of HHS must accept the state's assurances that its
rates meet Boren Amendment standards.3 10 If the state makes findings
and provides assurances to the Secretary at each stage of the overall
reduction plan, the state will build an evidentiary record supporting its
position that the compensation scheme meets the requirements of the
Boren Amendment. The state then will be able to meet provider chal-
lenges with the argument that HHS approved of its incremental scheme
numerous times over a period of years. Such a record should increase
the likelihood that a federal judge will find that each stage of the state's
cost-cutting program complied with the Boren Amendment.
Of course, a provider always could seek to challenge the entire cost-
cutting scheme. But, to throw out the entire scheme, a court would have
to find that even the smaller incremental changes in reimbursement
rates violate the Boren Amendment. Unless a provider can show that
such small changes produce dire economic consequences, most courts
still appear unwilling to place such severe restrictions on state
freedom.311
Thus, the Eleventh Amendment protection, which limits suits
against state officials to suits for prospective relief, establishes a clear
limit on the relief available to providers bringing claims under the Bo-
ren Amendment. These providers cannot receive retroactive or compen-
satory relief.312 More significantly, when courts use injunctions to strike
309. These small changes also may look more acceptable to courts. If an 80% reimbursement
rate was clearly reasonable and adequate under the Boren Amendment, it might be hard for a
court to say the 78% was clearly unreasonable. A full 10% reduction to a 70% reimbursement rate,
on the other hand, provides a much starker contrast and might tempt a court to find the state in
violation of the Boren Amendment.
310. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (1988).
311. Courts seem reluctant to review small changes in state reimbursement plans. See
Folden v. Washington State DSHS, 744 F. Supp. 1507, 1525 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (using language
deferential to the state and invoking the arbitrary and capricious standard of review); St. Michael
Hosp. v. Thompson, 725 F. Supp. 1038, 1039, 1045 (W.D. Wis. 1989) (invoking the Burford absten-
tion doctrine); see also Friedman v. Perales, 668 F. Supp. 216, 221-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (invoking
the arbitrary and capricious standard).
312. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-68 (1974).
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down a particular cost-cutting scheme, they may replace it with an old,
acceptable reimbursement program.3 13 This judicial solution suggests
that, if states enact Medicaid reforms in a piecemeal fashion, they may
succeed in preserving at least some cost-cutting reforms.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress easily could remedy the dilemma of uncertainty for states
enacting new cost containment programs by passing legislation di-
recting HHS to set clear criteria on the limits of reasonable and ade-
quate reimbursement. Such legislation, however, would defeat the
purpose of the Boren Amendment. Setting federal boundaries for reim-
bursement would reduce the states' ability to enact innovative cost-con-
tainment measures that are sensitive to the varying local costs of health
care.
The Boren Amendment recognized the needs of states to enact ef-
fective cost-containment measures. It followed other amendments to
the Medicaid statute that allowed the states more freedom in restrict-
ing Medicaid benefits for recipients. In so doing, the Amendment cre-
ated a balance between the interests of patients and providers by
allowing states to distribute cutbacks in the program between provid-
ers, who can spread the costs to all patients, and Medicaid patients
themselves. State administrative agencies and legislatures, rather than
the federal judiciary, are in the best position to control these decisions.
In fact, Congress delegated its decision-making power to the states on
this issue. Federal courts should respect that delegation rather than
embark on attempts to set the societal balance themselves.
Instead, in Wilder the Supreme Court allowed providers to assert
Section 1983 challenges to reimbursement schemes and, in so doing,
created substantive federal statutory rights for providers under the Bo-
ren Amendment. Although the Court had previously expanded the use
of Section 1983 jurisprudence in other areas, its extension to Medicaid
does not fit in neatly with that previous expansion. Moreover, the crea-
tion of substantive rights for providers has created an additional bur-
den for states administering financially strapped Medicaid programs. In
fact, the increased potential for litigation over rates may make states
less likely to enact creative cost-control measures. State planning, how-
ever, which recognizes the inherent Eleventh Amendment limitations
on the providers' claims may enable states to restrict federal court in-
trusion on the reimbursement flexibility they received under the Boren
Amendment.
In some states, cost containment may significantly threaten the fi-
313. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
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nancial well-being of providers. Some providers may go out of business
if state containment programs are too severe. But any such threat is the
result of a state policy decision to allocate fewer resources to health
care. Until Congress chooses to reassert federal control over such deci-
sions, the courts should allow states to continue making these choices.
Providers, who generally are politically well-organized, will have signifi-
cant clout in state capitals. They may protect their interests success-
fully by lobbying state legislatures and state administrative agencies.
States also may provide some review of reimbursement decisions in
state court. But ultimately, allocating the costs of Medicaid is a funda-
mental decision about the distribution of societal wealth and must re-
main a political decision.
Michael D. Daneker*
* The Author wishes to thank Amy Clara Kwak for her suggestions and encouragement on
this Note.
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